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ince 2009 I have been writing a series of texts about the 
scope of the non-identity problem.2 When I offered my 
argument – the insignificant-causal-factors rejoinder – 
to the community of moral philosophers, I had expected that 
colleagues would readily admit that they had been unclear about 
the methodological status of the climate non-identity problem 
(C-NIP). But nothing of this sort happened. In this short opin-
ion piece, I try to explain different views on causality, using the 
paradigm theory. 
My line of reasoning cannot be fully repeated here but a short 
form goes as follows:
(1) The NIP in biomedical contexts cannot be contested. As an
illustration, I have used the case of a rape.3 If an abortion is ruled
out, this act will induce the existence of a particular child with a
unique genetic endowment.
(2) The extension of the scope of the biomedical NIP to the con-
text of climate change is problematic. The C-NIP is the view that
our energy/climate policy is among the factors that decide the
genetic identity of (distant) future persons. And if a risky climate
policy is not harmful for them, as Parfitians claim, theories of
climate justice need to be reassessed. I argued that these philos-
ophers skip the causality question and move directly to a moral
discussion. But their moral problems arise only if a very specific
concept of causation is employed.
Imagine the following: In 2020, child A was born. One year be-
fore, the parents of A had met in a disco for the first time. Before
entering this disco that very night, each of the prospective parents
considered him/herself to be single, but wanted to enter into a
relationship. In the club were hundreds of potential partners for
each of the actual parents-to-be of child A.
Two years before, the US president had announced that he would
leave the Paris climate agreement which led to a high emissions
policy in the US during the following years. One of the coal mines 
that was scheduled for closure in 2017 was in fact not closed un-
der the Trump administration, and one of the people working 
there was AA, the father-to-be of child A. Had the coal mine been 
closed as scheduled by the Obama administration, AA would have 
moved to another city and he would not have met BA, the moth-
er-to-be of child A.
Fifty years before, in 1968, a forest planting scheme took place 
in the Appalachians. This brought volunteers together, and one 
of them was AAA, the grandfather-to-be of child A. At that time 
he met the girlfriend of the grandmother-to-be (BAA) of child A. 
This girlfriend (BAA-X) introduced AAA to his later wife BAA, 
and without that gathering of volunteers in the Appalachian 
mountains, child A would not have been born in 2020.
Climatically, the year 1816 is known in Europe and North 
America as “the year without a summer”. During the calendrical 
summer, snow fell in New England and the sky was gloomy and 
dark all summer long (this extraordinary weather was caused by 
an eruption of Mount Tambora). Unlike in other years, the car-
penter AAAAAA, the great-great-great-grandfather-to-be of child 
A looked (and found) work in the south of the newly founded 
United States. He had a short affair with a woman who became 
pregnant and gave birth to BAAAA, the great-great-grandmother-
to-be of child A.
Around 700 years before the birth of child A, in the year 1320, 
one family in Central Europe made the decision to give up their 
farming existence and move to the city. At that time, Euro pean 
peasants suffered from what is today known as “the Little Ice 
Age”, that is a decrease of average temperatures (not induced by 
mankind). This also was one instant in the circuitous route that 
eventually led to the birth of child A.
2,000 years before the birth of child A, in the year 20 AD, a Ro-
man legionary who had the best chances to become emperor was 
killed by a falling roof tile when he marched through the streets of 
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Rome. This particular roof tile was rendered loose by dry weather 
during that summer (and the weeks before). The logging of the 
 forests in the Roman Empire had changed the climate regionally. 
The death of the Roman legionary (BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA...-XTRLY...) was “decisive” 
in the potpourri of events in the sense that without this historic 
event, the great-great (...)- mother-to-be (66 generations back) of 
child A would not have been born.
For the sake of argument, we assume that all these incidents, acts 
and policies (and with them, a myriad more) were “causal” for 
the conception of child A. Now, what conclusions can be drawn 
from such a sequence, or rather potpourri, of events? There were 
incidents (the regional logging at 20 AD and US climate policy 
since 2017) that were human-induced climatic events (as such 
giving rise to non-identity problems). And there were incidents 
such as the eruption of Mount Tambora or the “Little Ice Age” 
that were not anthropogenic thus being (non-)identity events, but 
not giving rise to moral (non-)identity problems.
The distinction between the (non-)identity effect and the 
(non-)identity problem should be clear by now. It requires a two-
fold ana lysis, the first one being epistemological, the second one 
ethical. Moral philosophers are often ill-equipped to deal with 
the former, which may be a reason why they tend to jump to the 
latter. But the causality discussion is antecedent to the morality 
discussion, and the latter depends on the outcomes of the former.
(3) The Parfitian concept of causation takes into account too
many necessary conditions, among them “insignificant” ones.
The  underlying rationale of the “insignificant-causal-factors
 rejoinder” is that the Parfitian concept of causation is at odds with
the  concept of causation that is usually used in law and science.
One example from the judicial sphere: if a man, out of anger, sets
fire to the car of his girlfriend, he caused the flame. It is true that
the car would not have burned if there were no oxygen in the air
that surrounds the car. But the oxygen still is not “causal” in the
burning of the car. At best, the oxygen is an auxiliary condition.
When a judge lists the causes for the arson in his summing up, he
will only consider the significant causal factors.
In a related but different way, statisticians (including climate sci-
entists who use statistics) cut causation chains short. Everyone
knows (or should know) the statistician’s favourite phrase: cor-
relation is not causation. But to describe the statistical concept
of causation is actually quite technical, involving terms such as
regression analysis, (in)significance levels and one-way analysis of
variance. It might suffice here to say that their concept is incom-
patible with the Parfitian concept of causation.
To justify his view on the climate NIP, Parfit uses the following
picture in his energy/climate ethics article: “As we have seen,
children conceived at different times would in fact be different
children. So the proportion of those later born who would owe
their existence to our choice would, like ripples in a pool, steadily
grow.”4 The ripple analogy is very instructive, but in reality it dif-
fers from the way Parfit used it. We must rather think of a pond
into which a great number of stones are thrown simultaneously
at every moment in time (not just one after another always at
the same spot). Their waves and ripples will superimpose on each
 other and create a picture that looks very non-linear, or chaotic.
Now refine this analogy and imagine that the stones are of differ-
ent sizes, from small pebbles to rocks.5 The item that symbolises 
the (risky) high emissions policy will make a ripple but all the 
 other items will also make ripples, sometimes much bigger 
ripples. 
The waves and ripples obviously hit the shore somewhere. Now, 
imagine that at one specific point of the shore there is a mea-
surement station that measures the height of each and every in-
coming wave. Think of a floater that moves vertically at a pier. A 
signal sounds as soon as incoming waves have a certain height, say 
10cm. The higher the incoming waves, the louder the signal. But 
the scientists have set the measurement mechanism in a way that 
small ripples (less than 10cm) do not trigger any signal. All stones 
are causal for a certain height of an incoming wave (= all anteced-
ent acts or events that were decisive for the birth of child A), but 
the range of the waves and ripples between zero and 10cm can 
be considered “insignificant”. That does not mean that the causal 
acts or events (climatic incidents at different times) did not exist, 
but their explanatory power is too weak, statistically speaking.
Did my argument change the debate? No. Interlocutors kept tell-
ing me that for the C-NIP to hold, all that is required is that if a 
particular policy were to happen, then a different combination of 
sperm and egg would result. 
I still think that the insignificant-causal-factors rejoinder is 
sound and that it refutes anyone who states that there are no 
 intergenerational climate duties because of the C-NIP. Likewise, 
the Parfitians continue to think that this is a “real world problem” 
and that it was not relativised by my argument. Someone must be 
wrong here, one might conclude. But there is maybe a third pos-
sibility, namely the paradigm perspective as outlined by Thomas 
Kuhn in 1962.6 Kuhn describes some turning points in the un-
derstanding of the world. According to Kuhn, the introduction 
of novel theories regularly and rightly provokes resistance from 
professionals whose particular field is concerned. Kuhn believes 
that resistance to new ideas is legitimate because it is the only way 
to make so-called “normal science” (science outside revolutionary 
times with paradigm shifts) possible. He holds that only through 
normal science can an academic community first explore the po-
tential reach and accuracy of the older paradigm and then work 
out the difficulties through the study of which a new paradigm 
may emerge.
Thus the third possibility is that both sides are right – each one 
within their own paradigm. This could explain why well-inten-
tioned and smart philosophers cannot agree. If adherents of the 
different paradigms are asked to review submissions of the other 
camp, sheer incomprehension may be the result. 
Jörg Tremmel is an Extraordinary Professor at the University of 
Tübingen, Germany.
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